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JAMES LUIS GEDO 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20050087-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH 
COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, FROM A CONVICTION OF 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT, AN INFRACTION, AND RESISTING OR 
INTERFERING WITH AN OFFICER IN THE DISCHARGE OF DUTY, A 
CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, BEFORE THE HONORABLE SAMUEL 
MCVEY. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether this Court should address Points I and II of the appellant's brief when 
the appellant's brief fails to comply with the briefing requirements of Rule 24 Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
1 
Standard of Review. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App. 135, ^8, 47 
P.3dl07. 
2. Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that Provo City did not have to 
respond to frivolous motions that were filed against the advice of counsel. 
Standard of Review. An appellate court review of a district court's "discretion in 
tailoring appropriate conditions under which . . .[litigant], may commence and prosecute 
future lawsuits" is under the abuse of discretion standard. Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 
351 (10th Cir. 1989). 
3. Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that Gedo could not submit any of 
his own motions. 
Standard of Review. An appellate court review of a district court's "discretion in 
tailoring appropriate conditions under which . . .[litigant], may commence and prosecute 
future lawsuits" is under the abuse of discretion standard. Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 
351 (10th Cir. 1989). 
4. Whether the trial court erred when it did not find inadequate the evaluations 
regarding Gedo's competency and when it found Gedo competent to stand trial. 
Standard of Review. A district court's "determination of whether a defendant is 
competent to proceed to trial is a mixed question of fact and law." State v. Woodland, 
945 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 1997). An appellate court review of a district court's "findings 
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on [a defendant's] ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding" is under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. An appellate court review of 
"whether the trial court should have deemed the competency evaluations inadequate" is 
under the plain error standard. State v. Arguellas, 2003 UT 1,^57, 63 P.3d 731. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-9-102 Disorderly Conduct 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move from 
a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive 
condition, by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior; 
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard in a 
public place; or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(2) "Public place,'1 for the purpose of this section, means any place to 
which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and 
includes but is not limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of 
schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, 
and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues 
after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction. 
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Utah Code Ann, § 76-8-305 Interference with Arresting Officer 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, 
or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a 
peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that 
person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by 
lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Gedo was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court with 
the belief that on or about March 5, 2003, James Luis Gedo committed the crimes of 
Disorderly Conduct, a Class C Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 
and Interference with Arresting Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-305. (R. at 0001-0002). 
On March 24, 2003, an arraignment was held before Judge Guy R. Burningham. 
Gedo was found by the Court to be indigent, and Laura H. Cabanilla was appointed to 
represent Gedo. A pretrial conference and hearing on motions was scheduled for May 12, 
2003. (R. at 0004-0006). Appellant's brief also notes that on March 24, 2003, a law and 
motion hearing regarding other matters was held before Judge Burningham and that those 
matters were also set for the same hearing on May 12, 2003. (Aplt. Brf. at 5). Since that 
hearing did not involve the current matter and no motions had been filed in this case prior 
to that hearing, none of the information from that hearing is provided in the record in this 
case, nor is it relevant for this appeal. 
On March 27, 2003; April 14, 2003; April 22, 2003; and May 12, 2003, counsel 
for Gedo filed packets of numerous motions by Gedo which were filed with a cover sheet 
stating that the motions were being filed at the request of Gedo but against the advice of 
counsel. (R. at 0040, 0054, 0058, 0077). 
On May 12, 2003, a hearing on the motions was held before Judge Burningham. 
The motions filed that day by Gedo, as well as all the other motions that were filed 
against counsel's advice in this case as well as the others, were found to be not relevant to 
the case and stricken without need for the City to respond. After Gedo waived his right to 
a speedy trial, the court granted Gedo's motion for a six (6) month continuance of the 
matter. Gedo was ordered not to file any further motions that were against the advice of 
counsel. (R. at 0065-0067). 
On July 21, 2003, the matter came before Judge Burningham on a Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel filed by Laura Cabanilla. After entering into an agreement with 
Gedo, regarding Gedo's conduct, Laura Cabanilla agreed to stay on as counsel. (R. at 
0104-0105). 
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On December 17, 2003, another Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel was filed at 
Gedo's request. (R. at 0117-0118). At the hearing on January 9, 2004, the motion was 
withdrawn by Gedo's counsel because Gedo agreed it was in his best interest to keep 
counsel in these matters. (R. at 0125). 
At a hearing June 1, 2004, Provo City raised the issue of Gedo's competency. 
After some discussion, the court ordered competency evaluations be completed. The 
trials in this matter and others were continued pending the results of the competency 
evaluations. (R. at 0133-0134). 
On September 13, 2004, a hearing was held to determine Gedo's competency to 
stand trial. (R. at 0142-0143). After a discussion in chambers, Provo City stipulated on 
the record to the findings of Dr. Patrick Panos, Ph.D., and Dr. Bert P. Cundick, Ph.D. 
(T.0260:4 at 8-12). Prior to the hearing, both Dr. Panos and Dr. Cundick had submitted 
competency evaluation reports regarding Gedo's competency. See Patrick Panos, Ph.D., 
Confidential Report of Competency Evaluation for James Louis Gedo, July 2, 2004; Bert 
P. Cundick, Competency Evaluation, July 2-3, 2004, both attached as addenda (while 
Gedo's brief states these evaluations "are part of court record," it fails to cite where in the 
record it is located and Apellee was unable to find it. Therefore, both evaluations are 
attached as addenda.) While noting Gedo had a mental disorder, both evaluators found 
Gedo competent. Panos Evaluation, 3-4, 6; Cundick Evaluation, 1, 7-9. 
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Dr. Panos testified at the competency hearing on September 13, 2004. Dr. Panos 
noted that while Gedo generally "didn't show any symptoms," that "with regards to legal 
matters, interpretation of the law, interpretation of international treatises, that he, he [sic] 
had beliefs that would be considered extreme to the point that, that [sic] they would be 
considered delusional." (T.0260:6 at 16-23). After noting this difficulty, Dr. Panos 
found that Gedo "was not mentally ill in the a, [sic] classical sense that was covered by 
the statute. (T.0260:6-7 at 24-25, 1). Dr. Panos further testified that when he gave Gedo 
"the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA)]," 
which presents "fictitious legal situations" followed by responses by the examinee on 
whether "they understand the process, can they understand the idea of [sic] behind a plea 
bargain, what's the advantages and disadvantages," that Gedo "was able to understand 
them completely." (T.0260:7 at 7-14). Dr. Panos noted, however, that Gedo "couldn't 
weigh what's the advantages or disadvantages" for his own cases. (T.0260:7 at 19-25/ 
Dr. Panos also noted that Gedo "tended to lecture [his counsel] about the legal precedence 
and the interpretation." (T.0260:8-9 at 25, 1-3). 
After brief arguments by Gedo's counsel and Provo City, Judge McVey found 
Gedo competent to proceed to trial. (T.0260:19-20 at 5-9, 19-21). More specifically, 
Judge McVey found "that both reports indicated that [Mr]. Gedo is an extremely 
intelligent person who understands probably to a greater degree than most other members 
of society the nature of the proceedings against him and . . . both doctors determined that 
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he was able to participate, that he was competent to participate meaningfully in the 
preparation and presentation of his defense." (T.0260:19 at 9-16). After noting Dr. 
Panos' one reservation regarding "maybe Mr. Gedo not being . . . able or willing to weigh 
pros and cons of accepting a, a [sic] plea bargain or something like that but he's elected to 
go to trial," Judge McVey found that "a pretty reasonable response of somebody that 
wants to go have their day in court. And it's probably reinforced by the fact that he and 
his brother have been successful in the past in presenting their case." (T.0260:19 at 16-
24). Judge McVey did "not find anything that would, here that would [sic] because of a 
mental disease or defect would, would, would [sic] defeat Mr. Gedo's ability to 
meaningfully participate in his defense." (T.0260:20 at 15-18). 
A jury trial was held on December 8 and 9, 2004, before Judge Samuel McVey. 
(R. at 0177-0178). Gedo was found not guilty of Disorderly Conduct, a class C 
misdemeanor; guilty of Disorderly Conduct, an infraction; and guilty of Interfering with 
an Arresting Officer, a class B misdemeanor. (R. at 00177-0182). On January 20, 2005, 
Gedo was sentenced to the statutory maximum for a Class B Misdemeanor, with all but 
ten (10) days of jail suspended. (R. at 0194-00197). On January 25, 2005, defendant filed 
a timely appeal. (R. at 0212). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The circumstances surrounding the incident leading to the charges against Gedo 
were presented in testimony during his jury trial on December 8 and 9, 2004. However, 
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over concern of the cost of extensive transcripts, Gedo's counsel and Provo City agreed to 
limit the transcripts to various pertinent hearings and only one testimony, that of Officer 
Phillip Webber, from the jury trial. (R. at 0254-0256). Thus, the record does not contain 
any testimony specifically describing defendant James Gedo's involvement in the incident 
on March 5, 2003. Nevertheless, Gedo's three arguments can be adequately and 
completely addressed without reference to the underlying incident. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jury found Gedo guilty of violating Section 76-9-102(l)(b), Utah Code 
Annotated, Disorderly Conduct, an infraction, and Section 76-8-305, Utah Code 
Annotated, Interference with Arresting Officer, a Class B misdemeanor. Gedo challenges 
the verdict and appeals for dismissal of the charge. 
The trial court did not commit an error that violated Gedo's constitutional rights by 
not allowing Gedo to file his own motions. The court has the authority to make 
appropriate orders to regulate the conduct of the parties in proceedings. Gedo chose to 
exercise his mutually exclusive right to the assistance of counsel in this criminal 
proceeding. His attorney had ultimate control over the tools used to accomplish trial 
objectives. 
The trial court did not err in following the advice of both competency evaluators to 
find Gedo competent to stand trial. Both evaluators did extensive evaluations of Gedo's 
history and his current competence, and it was not clearly erroneous to follow that advice. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT'S POINT I AND POINT II ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
AND NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24 UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed. . . .When considering arguments on appeal, we look to the 
requirements of Rule 24 to determine whether an appellant has adequately briefed the 
issue. Rule 24 requires that an appellant's brief contain [a] statement of the issues 
presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority; and (A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved 
in the trial court. . . . In addition, this rule requires that the 'argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including 
the ground for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.'" State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App. 
135,^8,9, 47 P.3 107. 
"[T]o permit meaningful appellate review, briefs must comply with the briefing 
requirements sufficiently to 'enable us to understand . . . what particular errors were 
allegedly made, where in the record those errors can be found, and why, under applicable 
authorities, those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or other relief.'" Burns v. 
Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197,199 (Utah App. 1996); see also State v. Garner\ 2002 UT 
App. 234,1f8, 52 P.3d 467. 
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Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(7) states that "[t]he statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All 
statement of the facts and references to proceedings below shall be supported by citations 
to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule." Under Utah R. App. P. Rule 
24(e) "[references shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant 
to Rule 11(b). . . ." Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(e). 
"When an appellant's argument contains no citations to the record and no legal 
authority, a court declines to reach the issues." Utah v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 
1992). Gedo fails to support his arguments with citations to the record or with any legal 
analysis or authority. In Gedo's entire brief only two cases are used to support the issues 
in the brief or provide any meaningful analysis to his argument. 
Gedo's brief fails to comply with several of the briefing requirements of Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. While the brief contains citations to a handful 
of hearing transcripts, the brief does not contain citations to any other portion of the 
record on appeal despite numerous references to actions in and by the trial court and other 
factual events. Additionally, while the brief purports to provide a standard of appellate 
review for questions of law, it fails to explain how that standard is the proper standard for 
the issues presented in POINTS I and II. The case cited in the brief in support of the 
standard of appellate review, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995), 
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addresses arrest and search and seizure law, issues unrelated to the issues in the current 
appeal. 
Finally, and most importantly, the brief fails to provide legal analysis or authority 
to support either of the first two issues in his brief. The arguments in POINTS I and II of 
this case were copied almost verbatim from those made and rejected as inadequately 
briefed in another case filed before this court. See Provo City v. Gedo, 2006 UT App 43 
(unpublished; attached as addendum); Aplt. Brf. at 15-22, Provo City v. Gedo, No. 2004-
0225-CA. The arguments for POINTS I and II contain no additional statutory or case law 
and no additional relevant arguments. While POINT I includes one additional paragraph 
on alleged errors by the prosecutor, it does not add any additional analysis to the issue 
presented, whether the trial court erred in its actions. The only addition in POINT II 
from the previously rejected brief involves an admission that "some of [Gedo's] motions 
and requests would appear so bizarre that our argument regarding [Gedo's] incompetency 
should be strengthened." This statement does not lend any additional support to Point II. 
This leaves POINTS I and II just as inadequately briefed as the previous brief this Court 
previously rejected. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT PROVO 
CITY DID NOT HAVE TO RESPOND TO FRIVOLOUS MOTIONS FILED 
AGAINST THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL 
A. Counsel for Gedo has not adequately briefed this issue. 
"[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, Gedo has not adequately briefed the issue in Point One of his brief 
(Aplt. Brf. at 20), and this Court should not address it. In Point I of Gedo's brief, Gedo 
cites to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Aplt. Brf. at 22-23) which do not apply to this 
case. See URCrP 1. This is a criminal case and the URCrP Rule 12 for motions governs. 
URCrP Rule 12(a) states that "[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion, which, unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in 
accordance with this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the 
ground upon which it is made and relief sought...." There is no language in URCrP 
Rule 12 that obligates the prosecutor to respond to motions. 
B. Court has authority to control proceedings. 
Courts have the authority to "provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before 
it or its officers . . .[and] to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of its 
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial 
proceeding before it in every matter." (Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(3)(5)). Furthermore, 
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URCrP Rule 33 states, "[t]he court may make appropriate orders regulating the conduct 
of officers, parties, spectators and witnesses prior to and during the conduct of any 
proceeding." (emphasis added). Accordingly, on May 12, 2003, Judge Burningham, 
having considered the motions, found that the motions Gedo filed that day as well as all 
the other motions filed against counsel's advice were not relevant to the case and that the 
City need not respond. Judge Burningham either denied or struck the motions and ordered 
Gedo not to file any more motions that were against the advice of counsel. (R at 0065-
0067; T.0258 at 42). 
The mere fact that Gedo received an unfavorable result in the trial court does not 
give rise to the conclusion that the trial court erred when it did not require the prosecution 
to respond to the many frivolous motions filed by Gedo. "To establish prejudice, it is not 
enough to claim that the alleged errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome or 
could have had a prejudicial effect on the fact finders. To be found sufficiently 
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively show that a 'reasonable probability' exists that, 
but for . . . error, the result would have been different. 'Reasonable probability is defined 
as that sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the verdict.'" State v. 
Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 76 (Utah App. 1989). URCrP Rule 30(a) states that "[a]ny error, 
effect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall 
be disregarded." 
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In this case, if Provo City had responded to the many motion's filed by Gedo, 
Provo City would have opposed the motions setting forth reasons the motions should be 
denied. Provo City agreed with the court's decision that the motions and any responses to 
the motions would not have changed the outcome. Gedo has not established that he was 
prejudiced by the court's decision not to consider any pro se motions and has failed to 
show that a reasonable probability existed that if all the frivolous motions filed by the 
defendant to the trial court were responded to by the prosecution that the outcome would 
have been different. "Gedo has failed to show that the motions and 'demands' were even 
pertinent to his case and that any purported error on the part of the trial court in denying 
them would have affected his substantial rights." Gedo, 2006 UT App 43 n.l. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT INSTRUCTED GEDO 
NOT TO SUBMIT ANY OF HIS OWN MOTIONS 
In POINT II of Gedo's brief, Gedo alleges that the trial court should have allowed 
him to file his own motions with the court; motions not filed by his attorney. Gedo argues 
that not allowing him to file these motions was an infringement of his constitutional 
rights. (Aplt. Brf. at 24). 
Right to assistance of counsel is mutually exclusive. 
"The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees each criminal 
defendant the right to assistance of counsel." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 f 15, 979 P.2d 
799 (quoting State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183,187 (Utah 1987)). It is well established that 
the Sixth Amendment also grants an accused the fundamental right to defend himself in 
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person. Id. at f 15 (quoting Faretta v. California, All U.S. 806, 818-21, 45 L.ed. 2d 562, 
95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975)); Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187 & n.6.; State v. Hamilton, 731 P.2d 
505, 507 (Utah 1987). These mutually exclusive rights must be construed in harmony 
with each other as far as possible." Id. at [^15 (See Faretta, All U.S. at 820-21) (emphasis 
added). 
In this case, Gedo chose to exercise his right to the assistance of counsel in his 
criminal proceeding and the "attorney has ultimate control over the means used to 
accomplish trial objectives." State v. Valenica, 2001 UT App 159, T[16, 27 P.3d 573.] The 
defendant's counsel is not an assistant. "The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment 
contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, 
shall be an aide to a willing defendant. . . . In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a 
master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which 
the [Sixth] Amendment insists. It is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer 
manage and present his case, law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to 
make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas." Faretta v. California, All U.S. 
806; 95 S.Ct 2525 at 817. 
]In State v. Valencia, 2001 UT 15, 27 P.3d 573, the appellant argued that the trial 
court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to appoint substitute 
counsel. The appellant, in one of his arguments on the issues, complains that counsel 
would not file discovery motions or a motion to suppress at his request. The court found 
that the attorney had ultimate control over the means used to accomplish trial objectives. 
Counsel was under no obligation to comply with appellant's desire because motions are a 
means used to accomplish trial objectives. 
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Gedo prepared numerous handwritten, unintelligible motions with no viable 
argument that dealt with the issues in the case and had no basis in law to respond to. Gedo 
requested that his attorney submit these frivolous motions and Laura Cabanilla did so on 
March 27, 2003; April 14, 2003; April 22, 2003; and May 12, 2003. (R. at 0040, 0054, 
0058, 0077). 
In this case, the district court did not violate Gedo's constitutional rights when 
Judge Burningham ordered Gedo to only file motions through counsel and ordered 
Gedo's counsel not to file any further motions that were against the advice of counsel. (R. 
at 0065; T.0258 at 53). Gedo has not established that he was prejudiced by the court's 
decision not to consider any pro se motions. He has not identified what those motions 
would have been and has not established that they would have prevailed. As stated 
previously, the courts have the authority to "provide for the orderly conduct of 
proceedings before it or its officers . . .[and] to control in the furtherance of justice the 
conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with 
a judicial proceeding before it in every matter." (Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(3)(5)). 
Furthermore, URCrP Rule 33 states "[t]he court may make appropriate orders regulating 
the conduct of officers, parties, spectators and witnesses prior to and during the conduct 
of any proceeding." Accordingly, on May 12, 2003, Judge Burningham, having 
considered the motions, found that the motions Gedo filed that day as well as all the other 
motions filed against counsel's advice were not relevant to the case and that the City need 
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not respond. Judge Burningham either denied or struck the motions and ordered Gedo not 
to file any motions that were against the advice of counsel. (R. at 0065; T.0258 at 53). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY DEEMED 
ADEQUATE THE EVALUATIONS OF GEDO'S COMPETENCY AND 
WHEN IT FOUND GEDO COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL. 
"It is well established that due process requires that a defendant be mentally 
competent to plead guilty and to stand trial." Arguelles, 2003 UT at ^47; see Utah Code 
Ann. 77-15-1 (2005). Gedo's brief essentially makes two arguments on appeal: 1) the 
trial judge should have "deemed the competency evaluations inadequate" (Aplt. Brf. at 
31-32) and 2) the trial judge should have found Gedo incompetent to proceed. (Aplt. Brf. 
at 35). While these issues overlap, separate discussions would be helpful. 
A. The Doctors' evaluations of Gedo's competency were adequate. 
A trial court errs when it bases its competency determination "upon competency 
evaluations that are clearly inadequate" in the face of "significant evidence that defendant 
had a serious mental disease." Arguelles, 2003 UT at f^58 (citing Hays v. Murphy, 663 
F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1981). In distinguishing Hays from the facts in Arguelles, the Court 
noted that there was less "evidence of incompetence in the current case [than] in Hays." 
Id. The Court also found "the evaluations relied upon in Hays were much less thorough 
than the ones relied upon in [Arguelles]" Id. at ^ [59. 
Regarding the second distinguishing fact, Arguelles noted that the competency 
determination in Hays "was based primarily upon the report of a single, 30-minute 
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interview conducted by four staff members, three of whom had never before interviewed 
defendant." Id. Additionally, the evaluators in Hays avoided probing questions, and 
"engaged in only a superficial inquiry into matters such as the time of day." Id. Finally, 
the interview in Hays "took place on a noisy prison cell block, and no psychological tests 
were administered." Id. In contrast, the evaluators in Arguelles "studied Arguelles's past 
mental and physical history and then spent a total of eight hours with him, inquiring into 
his thought processes and evaluating his capabilities." Id. 
The competency evaluations conducted on Gedo clearly surpass the one thirty-
minute evaluation in Hays and compare well with the evaluations in Arguelles. The 
evaluations by Dr. Panos and Dr. Cundick went beyond superficial questioning, looking 
into his past mental and physical history, Panos Evaluation, 2; Cundick Evaluation, 2-5, 
utilizing psychological tests, Panos Evaluation, 1,3; Cundick Evaluation, 2, 6, and 
inquiring into his thought processes and evaluating his capabilities. Panos Evaluation, 3, 
4-6; Cundick Evaluation, 6-9. Both evaluations occurred in Gedo's counsel's conference 
room rather than a prison cell block. Panos Evaluation, 2; Cundick Evaluation, 3. 
Appellant's brief indicates that it is not arguing that the evaluations were 
inadequate for failing to address all the issues required by the statute (Aplt. Brf. at 33); 
instead, Appellant's brief makes the novel argument that the evaluations were inadequate 
because the evaluators came to the wrong conclusion about whether Gedo's mental 
disorder fit under the statute. (Aplt. Brf. at 32). While Appellant's brief cites to 
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Arguelles for the requirements for competency evaluations, it makes no claim that 
Arguelles directs a court to find a competency evaluation to be inadequate due to an 
inaccurate conclusion. Arguelles focuses, instead, on the method and procedure used by 
the evaluators in the evaluation process. 2003 UT at [^59. The evaluators fully discussed 
all of the factors required by the statute and spent the time and effort required by 
Arguelles, and even assuming, arguendo, that the evaluators came to the wrong 
conclusion, the trial court had no reason to find their evaluations inadequate. The 
ultimate decision of whether those statutory factors weigh in favor of finding a defendant 
competent to stand trial rests with the trial judge and is a question of fact; this issue is 
discussed below. 
B. The trial judge's determination of Gedo's competency was not clearly 
erroneous. 
Section 77-15-2 of the Utah Code states that 
"a person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental 
disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding. 
A trial court's findings on a defendant's "ability to consult with counsel with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding is subject to a clearly erroneous standard of 
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review." Woodland, 945 P.2d at 667. To challenge that finding, Appellant "must marshal 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the findings of the trial court and show that 
evidence to be insufficient." Id. at 668. Appellant's brief fails to meet this requirement. 
Appellant's brief cites to a handful of sentences from the trial judge's findings (Aplt. Brf. 
at 17-18, 30-31, 33), but it makes no attempt to present any evidence in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's ruling. Instead, it "avoids addressing the weight of the 
evidence supporting the court's findings," Arguelles, 2003 UT at [^68, by avoiding or 
taking out of context any statements that argue for finding Gedo competent. For example, 
Appellant's brief quotes Dr. Panos as testifying "I questioned whether he could rationally 
evaluate, you know, realistic options" and "no, he would not engage in reasonable 
considerations of options, that he would be locked into, to his, belief systems." (Aplt. 
Brf. at 29). However, those quotes are taken out of context; Dr. Panos prefaced both 
comments by limiting them to Gedo's interpretation of "international treaties that could 
affect these proceedings" and "if you got him into the, the [sic] certain situations," 
respectively. (T.0260:8 at 6-9, 14-17). 
In fact, Dr. Panos repeatedly noted that Gedo's mental illness was limited in effect 
and scope: "I mean he's not psychotic, he's not, he doesn't, his, his affect is, is normal" 
(T.0260:9 at 11-12); "And where he can function normally, he can consider hypothetical 
situations, the way it's written he, he could engage in, I mean, he has the capability of 
doing it" (T.0260:9 at 13-16); and "Mr. Gedo's mental disorder should have no 
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substantial impact on the nature and quality of his relationship with his legal counsel." 
Panos Evaluation, 5. Finally, Appellant's brief utterly fails to cite to Dr. Cundick's 
similar findings regarding Gedo's ability to consult with counsel and engage in reasoned 
choices of legal strategies and options. Cundick Evaluation, 7-8. 
Although not delineated specifically this way in Appellant's brief, Appellant's 
claims against the finding of competency can be divided into two main arguments: 1) 
Gedo has a substantial mental illness, which means he is automatically incompetent (Aplt. 
Brf. at 28-29, 32) and 2) Gedo specifically lacked the ability to consult or assist with 
counsel and to engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options. (Aplt. Brf. at 
34). 
In an apparent attempt to argue that all substantial mental illnesses make a person 
incompetent, Appellant's brief repeatedly references Dr. Panos' opinion that although 
Gedo had a substantial mental illness, that illness did not fit under the statute. (Aplt. Brf. 
at 15,28-29). Section 77-15-2 specifically rejects this argument when it limits 
incompetency to those with "a mental disorder or mental retardation resulting either in" 
two distinct inabilities. This clearly shows that at least some, if not many, mental 
disorders will not result in a finding of incompetence. Thus, this apparent argument is 
clearly flawed. 
Appellant's arguments regarding Gedo's ability to consult with counsel and 
engage in reasoned choice also fails. First, Appellant's brief fails to meet the clearly 
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erroneous standard. In addition to its failure in marshaling the evidence, as noted above, 
Appellant's brief makes not attempt to explain why the trial judge's findings were clearly 
erroneous. Appellant's brief fails to show that "the factual findings of the trial court are . 
. . against the great weight of authority." Arguelles, 2003 UT at f^68. Appellant's brief 
repeatedly notes how much Dr. Panos struggled in making his ultimate decision. More 
specifically, Dr. Panos admitted that on the question of whether "this is a mental illness or 
is it his choice" you could argue it either way. Thus, at best, Appellant can only argue 
that the evaluators' conclusions were debatable. This clearly does not meet the clearly 
erroneous standard. Second, the trial court finding of competence was accurate and not 
clearly erroneous. 
Regarding Gedo's ability to consult with counsel, Woodland noted a 1993 change 
in the statute regarding competency that changed the requirement from "assist with 
counsel" to the less demanding "consult with his counsel." 945 P.2d at 669. The Court 
also indicated that "competency is established when a defendant can, but not necessarily 
will, assist, or consult with counsel." Id. In their evaluations, both Dr. Panos and Dr. 
Cundick, while noting Gedo's difficulties and delusions, emphasized the fact that Gedo 
was able to consult with his counsel. Panos Evaluation, 4-5; Cundick Evaluation, 7-8. 
Thus, even if one accepted Appellant's argument that the evaluators misinterpreted the 
statute regarding what mental illnesses fell within its boundaries, the evaluators' 
statements regarding this specific factor clearly show that both evaluators were of the 
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opinion that Gedo could, but would not always be willing, to consult with counsel. In his 
testimony, Dr. Panos noted that Gedo "tended to lecture [his counsel] about the legal 
precedence [sic] and the interpretation, and he did not see you as being knowledgable 
[sic] in, in [sic] any realistic sense." (T.0260:8-9 at 23-25, 1-3). A defendant only has to 
"display the ability to consult with [counsel]"; he does not have to be willing "to agree 
with counsel." Woodland, 945 P.2d at 669. Appellant's brief fails to demonstrate in any 
way that Gedo is unable to consult with counsel; Appellant's argument, instead, focuses 
on Gedo's failure to agree with his counsel's viewpoints. (Aplt. Brf. at 30). 
Regarding Gedo's capacity to engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and 
options, it is again noted that Appellant's brief fails to argue that the trial court's decision 
was clearly erroneous. Additionally, Appellant's argument ignores the fact that the 
question regarding a defendant's capacity to engage in reasoned choice is only one of a 
number of factors to be considered by the evaluator. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 (stating 
"in addition to other factors"). Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that Gedo did not have 
the capacity to "engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options," all six of the 
other "capacity" factors weigh in favor of finding Gedo competent. See Panos 
Evaluation, 4-5 (Response to Questions: 2-7); Cundick Evaluation, 8. Appellant's brief 
fails to challenge the other factors. 
Finally, Gedo's "inflexible" unwillingness to consider a plea bargain and his desire 
to file frivolous motions are insufficient to show that he was unable to engage in reasoned 
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choice of legal strategies and options. While Gedo's decisions and efforts in his own 
defense "may have been legally imprudent, it cannot in and of itself constitute 
incompetence." See Woodland, 945 P.2d at 669. Specifically, Judge McVey found 
Gedo's decision to refuse any possible plea bargain to be "a pretty reasonable response of 
somebody that wants to go have their day in court." (T.0260:19 at 16-22). Judge McVey 
also found the reasonableness of that response "reinforced by the fact that [Gedo] and his 
brother have been successful in the past in presenting their case." (T.0260:19 at 22-24). 
Finally, Appellant's brief has failed to show how the filing of numerous frivolous motions 
proves incompetence. Frivolous motions can be filed for numerous reasons, frequently to 
cause expense and delay to the other party. If filing a frivolous motion proved 
incompetence, Rule 11 sanctions would be unnecessary because any attorney that filed a 
frivolous motion would be deemed incompetent to continue. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Provo City asks this Court to affirm the trial court's 
verdict finding Gedo guilty of Disorderly Conduct and Interfering with an Officer in the 
Discharge of Duty. 
DATED this 3 3 day of March, 2006. 
vU'Wwx <f, l^yr^T^y\ 
VERNON F. ROMNEY / " / 
Counsel for Appellee l ° 
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RULES 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(a)(7) 
The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of the facts and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24(e) 
References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant 
to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed 
statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published 
depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover pages of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered 
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. 
References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages 
of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
URCP Rule 11(b)(2) 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an 
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attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; 
URCrPRuIel 
(a) This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure." 
(b) These rules shall govern the procedure in all criminal cases in the courts of 
this state except juvenile court cases. These rules are intended and shall be construed to 
secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of 
unnecessary expense and delay. 
(c) These rules shall take effect on July 1, 1980. Thereafter, they shall govern 
all criminal proceedings commenced and, so far as just and practicable, all proceedings 
then pending. All statutes and rules in conflict therewith are repealed. 
URCrPRulel2 
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which, 
unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with this rule. 
A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made 
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and the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a memorandum unless 
required by the court. 
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. When the time for filing a response to a 
motion and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the motion for 
decision. The request shall be a separate pleading captioned "Request to Submit for 
Decision." The Request to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion 
was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply 
memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. The 
notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If no party files a request, 
the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written 
motion. 
(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or 
information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court 
or to charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the 
court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding; 
(B) motions to suppress evidence; 
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(C) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or. 
(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 76-3-402 shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior to the date 
of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten days of the entry of 
conviction. Motions for a reduction of criminal offense pursuant to Utah Code Section 
76-3-402 may be raised at any time after sentencing upon proper service of the motion on 
the appropriate prosecuting entity. 
(d) Motions to suppress. A motion to suppress evidence shall: 
(1) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed; 
(2) set forth the standing of the movant to make the application; and. 
(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the 
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to 
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them. 
If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by 
the non-moving party is required, unless the court orders otherwise. At the 
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable time 
for all parties to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the motion and 
at the hearing. 
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(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court 
for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual 
issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the 
record. 
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make 
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute 
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
(g) Except in justices1 courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all 
proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of 
law as are made orally. 
(h) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued 
for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or information. 
Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law relating to a statute of 
limitations. 
URCrP Rule 30(a) 
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
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URCrPRule33 
The court may make appropriate order regulating the conduct of officers, 
parties, spectators and witnesses prior to and during the conduct of any proceeding. 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1 
No person who is incompetent shall be tried for a public offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is incompetent to proceed if he is 
suffering from a mental disorder or mental retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(4) 
(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their examination and in their report to 
the court consider and address, in addition to any other factors determined to be relevant 
by the experts: 
(a) the defendant's present capacity to: 
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(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations against 
him; 
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; 
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible 
penalties, if applicable, that may be imposed in the proceedings 
against him; 
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; 
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against him; 
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and 
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable; 
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on the 
nature and quality of the defendant's relationship with counsel; 
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being administered: 
(i) whether the medication is necessary to maintain the defendant's 
competency; and 
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the defendant's demeanor 
and affect and ability to participate in the proceedings. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(3)(5) 
Every court has authority to: 
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers; 
(5) control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial officers, and 
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ORME, Judge: 
We have determined that "the decisional process would not be 
significantly aided by oral argument," Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3), 
and that the issues presented are readily resolved under 
applicable law. 
Provo City's argument is well taken that, given the 
requirements of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
we should not consider the issues Gedo has inadequately briefed. 
See State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135,118, 47 P.3d 107. ("It is 
well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed.") (internal quotations 
and citation omitted). Indeed, in continuing his admitted 
practice of "tilting at windmills," Gedo argues on appeal that 
the trial court erred in several respects, but he wholly fails to 
establish "why, under applicable authorities, those errors are 
material ones necessitating reversal or other relief." 
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CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF COMPETENCY EVALUATION 
FOR 
JAMES LOUIS GEDO 
Name: James Louis Gedo 
Date of Birth: April 13, 1957 
Age: 47 years- 3 months 
Case #: 021402883 
Offense: Criminal Trespass; Marijuana Possession, Paraphernalia; Resisting/Interfering With 
Police; Obstructing Justice; and Giving False Name or Address to Police 
Court: Fourth Judicial District Court 
Judge: Steven D. McVey 
Prosecuting Attorney: Provo City Attorney 
Defense Attorney: Laura H. Cabanilla 
Date of Referral: June 29, 2004 
Evaluation Date(s): July 1,2004 
Report Date: July 2, 2004 
Evaluator: Patrick Panos, PhD , 
Reason For Evaluation: James Louis Gedo was referred for a competency evaluation by order 
of Judge Steven D. McVey of the Fourth Judicial District Court, State of Utah, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 77-15-1. 
Evaluation Data and Reasoning: The following methods, procedures, and information were 
used in completing this evaluation: 
Assessment Procedures: A clinical interview was conducted with the defendant, James 
Louis Gedo, on July 1, 2004, during which time the purpose of the present evaluation was 
explained. The defendant was informed that this was not a confidential evaluation, and that 
the results would be made available, in writing, to the judge and attorneys involved. The 
defendant was invited to decline answering questions he did not feel comfortable answering. 
The defendant acknowledged an understanding of these statements. 
In addition to the clinical interview with the defendant, interviews were conducted with 
Maria Sanchez, the defendant's mother; and David Gedo, the defendant's brother. These 
family members were invited to the evaluation by the defendant, and they were also 
presented with the limits to confidentiality. 
Psychological Tests Administered: 
• MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool- Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) 
• Mental Status Examination 
• Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) 
Competency Evaluation 
James Louis Gedo 
Page 2 
Records and Documentation Reviewed in Preparation of This Report: 
• Order Re: Competency Evaluation of Defendant 
• Letter From Laura H. Cabanilla (Defendant's Lawyer) to Danette Faretta-Brady 
(Director of Legal Services, Utah State Hospital) dated June 23, 2004 
• Provo Police Department Investigative and Arrest Reports 
• Utah Criminal History Record (dated July 31, 2002) 
• Utah State Hospital Treatment Records 
Relevant Background/History: Mr. James Louis Gedo is a 47-year-old, single, Hispanic, 
male living in Utah County. He was born in Uruguay as the second of four children (2 sisters 
and 1 brother). His family legally immigrated to the United States when he was 
approximately 6-years-old. One year later Mr. Gedo's parents divorced and he remained in 
the custody of his mother along with his other siblings and was subsequently raised in Provo, 
Utah. According to Utah State Hospital records, Mr. Gedo had some social difficulties as a 
youth due to his self-perception of having a low social economic status. Additionally, in 
high school he had a reputation of being a "heavy illegal drug user," however, Mr. Gedo 
denies having used drugs during this time period. When Mr. Gedo was approximately 20-
years-old, he was in an auto accident that caused a brain stem injury. Consequently, he was 
hospitalized in Utah Valley Regional Medical Center for approximately one month, and then 
required several months of physical therapy to learn to walk again. He was subsequently 
referred to vocational rehabilitation for job training, however, he was referred into mental 
health treatment with the Brigham Young University Comprehensive Treatment Center due 
to his resistiveness in complying with program expectations. Since that time, Mr. Gedo has 
been unable to maintain employment due to repeated conflicts with his supervisors. 
According to Utah State Hospital records, one of Mr. Gedo's major difficulties is his 
inability to accept he expectations of others, and will easily become engage in conflicts as a 
result. Consequently, not only has Mr. Gedo had difficulty maintaining employment, but he 
has had numerous encounters with the police in which he becomes belligerent and non-
compliant. As a result, he has had numerous arrests and mental health examinations. 
Assessment Findings: Mr. Gedo was interviewed in the conference room at his attorney's 
office in Provo, Utah on July 1, 2004. His complete evaluation took approximately 2 hours, 
during which time he was cautiously cooperative. Mr. Gedo did display suspiciousness, in 
that he video taped the entire evaluation, and he had his brother, mother, and a friend present 
to "witness" the evaluation. He answered all questions, however, he repeatedly expressed 
concern about my purpose and goals behind many questions. Nevertheless, when I explained 
my reasons behind a particular question, Mr. Gedo would typically answer. During the 
interview, Mr. Gedo's speech content was normal, and there was no indication of unusual or 
bizarre thought content, nor did he exhibit any unusual mannerisms. He denied suffering 
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from hallucinations. Mr. Gedo did express, however, many ideas and beliefs that were 
delusional in nature. For example, Mr. Gedo repeatedly described his belief that the police 
and courts were conspiring against him. He also believes that many laws and treaties are 
being ignored, and that he can stop these perceived treaty violations through appeals to the 
World Court. As a result, Mr. Gedo and his family believe that they will become 
millionaires as a result of settlements associated with their legal interpretations. It was 
interesting to note Mr. Gedo interactions with his attorney. Repeatedly when she attempted 
to explain the law, he would forcefully state that she was wrong. Additionally, Mr. Gedo's 
family would reinforce his interpretations of the law, as well as his beliefs about 
governmental conspiracies. 
In addition to the clinical interview, the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) was 
administered to Mr. Gedo to document if he is suffering from specific symptoms of a mental 
illness. The PAI is a well-recognized and professionally well-accepted psychological 
instrument used to assess a wide range of psychiatric symptoms. Results indicate that Mr. 
Gedo gave clinically valid responses, and he scored in the normal range on all areas assessed 
by the PAI. In examining Mr. Gedo's overall pattern of responses, he gave answers which 
indicate that he is hypervigilant in his interactions with others, and he is mistrustful of their 
motives. As a result, he is somewhat isolative, and he likely has few close relationships. 
Based on these findings, it is evident that Mr. Gedo is manifesting few symptoms of a 
chronic mental illness, other than suffering from serious delusions. 
As part of the evaluation for competency, the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-
Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) was administered to Mr. Gedo. The MacCAT-CA is 
a formal assessment used to evaluate a defendant's capacity to competently participate in the 
adjudication process. Obtained results indicated that Mr. Gedo has the knowledge and 
cognitive capacity need to competently to assist his lawyer in preparing his legal defense. 
Specifically, Mr. Gedo demonstrated an adequate understanding of the legal process, 
possessed the capacity to correctly identify case relevant information within a fictitious case, 
and demonstrated ability to make basic, rational legal decisions. Additionally, Mr Gedo 
expressed a suitable appreciation for his own legal predicament, and adequately described 
the potential consequences that he may face. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Gedo 
obtained these results because I specifically asked him to narrow his focus to the specific 
information contained within the MacCAT-CA, or to specific questions regarding his case. 
Therefore, obtained results indicate that Mr. Gedo has the needed knowledge and cognitive 
skills needed to assist his lawyer if he is actively and consciously focusing on relevant 
information while screening out his delusional beliefs. Consequentially, in regards to the 
particular charges that Mr. Gedo is currently facing, he demonstrated sufficient capacity to 
assist his lawyer as to meet the standards of competency, as established in Utah Code 
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Annotated § 77-15-1. Nevertheless, Mr. Gedo would not necessarily be competent in other 
legal situations. 
Summary: Mr. Gedo has a fixed and well-established delusional system regarding the 
conspiracies within the police, courts, government, and its supporting institutions. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Gedo demonstrates adequate cognitive abilities, and he has the capacity to 
function in a sophisticated manner. There is no indication of either hallucinations or mood 
disturbance. Based upon my clinical interview with Mr. Gedo and his family, as well as 
results obtained from psychological testing, it is my professional opinion that he meets the 
criteria for the following Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders- 4th Edition 
(DSM-IV) diagnoses: Axis I: [297.1]- Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type;[297.3]- Shared 
Psychotic Disorder; and Axis II: [V71.09]- No Diagnosis on Axis II. It should be noted that 
many people suffering from a delusional disorder remain relatively unimpaired in their 
cognitive and emotional functioning aside from their delusional belief. This also appears to 
be the situation in Mr. Gedo's case. As long as Mr. Gedo is asked to respond to situations 
not associated with his delusional beliefs, he has an excellent understanding of legal 
proceedings and is capable of making informed and rational legal decisions. Additionally, 
Mr. Gedo comprehends and appreciates the charges against him along with corresponding 
penalties, he has an excellent understanding of the judicial process, including the adversarial 
nature of court proceedings, and he is capable of identifying and disclosing to his counsel 
pertinent facts, events, and relevant information. It is also my opinion that Mr. Gedo would 
be considered incompetent if he were asked to respond to legal situations that were directly 
associated with his delusional beliefs. In summary, it is my professional opinion that Mr. 
Gedo is competent to proceed to trial on these current charges. 
Responses to Forensic Questions: 
1. Does James Louis Gedo suffer with a substantial mental illness? Yes, Mr. Gedo 
meets the criteria for the following Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders- 4th Edition (DSM-IV) diagnoses: Axis I: [297.1]- Delusional Disorder, 
Persecutory Type;[297.3]- Shared Psychotic Disorder; and Axis II: [V71.09]- No 
Diagnosis on Axis II. 
2. Does James Louis Gedo comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations 
against him? Yes, Mr. Gedo has a clear comprehension and appreciation of the 
charges and allegations against him. 
3. Can James Louis Gedo disclose to counsel the pertinent facts, events, and states 
of mind? Yes, Mr. Gedo can disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of 
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mind. 
4. Does James Louis Gedo appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties, if 
applicable, that may be imposed against him? Yes, Mr. Gedo has a clear 
understanding and appreciation of the range and nature of possible penalties that may 
be opposed against him. 
5. Can James Louis Gedo engage in reasoned choices of legal strategies and 
options? Yes, Mr. Gedo can engage in reasoned choices of legal strategies and 
options in regards to this current case. 
6. Does James Louis Gedo understand the adversarial nature of the proceeding 
against him? Yes, Mr. Gedo understands the adversarial nature of proceeding 
against him. 
7. Can James Louis Gedo manifest appropriate courtroom behavior? Yes, Mr. 
Gedo can manifest appropriate courtroom behavior. 
8. Can James Louis Gedo testify relevantly? Yes, Mr. Gedo can testify relevantly. 
9. What is the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on the 
nature and quality of defendant's relationship with counsel? Mr. Gedo's mental 
disorder should have no substantial impact on the nature and quality of his 
relationship with his legal counsel. I have noted, however, that Mr. Gedo discounts 
his lawyer's expertise if she gives an opinion that contradicts his delusional beliefs. 
Therefore, in other legal situations that may conflict with his delusional system, Mr. 
Gedo's mental health difficulties could have a significant impact on his ability to 
work effectively with his lawyer. 
10. What medications, if any, are being administered at this time? At the time of the 
evaluation, Mr. Gedo denied taking medications. 
11. Are the medications necessary in maintaining the defendant's competency. 
Currently, this question is not applicable since it is my opinion that Mr. Gedo is 
competent. Additionally, delusional disorders are often resistive to treatment through 
medications, particularly when the disorder is reinforced by close family members. It 
is therefore questionable whether medications could decrease Mr. Gedo delusional 
symptoms. 
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12. What are the effects of the medications, if any, on the defendant's demeanor and 
affect and ability to participate in the proceedings? Currently, Mr. Gedo is not 
taking medications, so this question is not applicable. 
Recommendations: Based upon results obtained through clinical interview with Mr. Gedo and 
his family, as well as from psychological testing, it is my professional opinion that he meets the 
criteria for the following Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders- 4th Edition 
(DSM-IV) diagnoses: Axis I: [297.1]- Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type;[297.3]- Shared 
Psychotic Disorder; and Axis II: [V71.09]- No Diagnosis on Axis II. As part of Mr. Gedo 
condition, he has a fixed and well-established delusional system regarding the conspiracies 
within the police, courts, government, and its supporting institutions, despite having the 
cognitive capacity to function in a sophisticated manner in other areas of his life. Additionally, 
as is common among people who suffer from a delusional disorder, Mr. Gedo exhibits few other 
mental health symptoms such as hallucinations or mood disturbance. As a result, when tested, 
Mr. Gedo had an excellent understanding of legal processes, and demonstrates the ability of 
making informed and rational legal decisions. More specifically, in regards to his current legal 
case, Mr. Gedo comprehends and appreciates the charges against him along with corresponding 
penalties. He has an excellent understanding of the judicial process, including the adversarial 
nature of court proceedings; and he is capable of identifying and disclosing to his counsel 
pertinent facts, events, and relevant information. Therefore, it is my professional opinion that 
Mr. James Louis Gedo meets the standards of competency, as established in Utah Code 
Annotated § 77-15-1 in this particular case . It is also my opinion that Mr. Gedo's delusional 
disorder may significantly impact his competency in other legal situations. Unfortunately, the 
nature of Mr. Gedo's condition will likely lead to such other legal situations, particularly since 
he becomes belligerent and paranoid in any situation involving police and other government 
officials. It is also likely that Mr. Gedo will respond inappropriately to questioning by police, 
and he could easily be charged with a large number of misdemeanors associated with each 
interaction. Respectfully, I wish to offer my opinion that the police and prosecutor may wish to 
be selective in the cases they decide to pursue, and focus mainly on cases not associated Mr. 
Gedo's reactions to police questioning. Because of his delusions, Mr. Gedo will consistently 
display resistive behavior to police questioning. As a result, a significant amount of time and 
limited legal^resources coulcTbe spent on Mr. Gedo as a consequence of each interaction with 
police. 
Patrick Panos, Ph.D. 
Licensed Psychologist 
rffCE/V/ED-JUL ISM 
Bert P. Cundick, Ph.D. 
Licensed Psychologist and 




Name: Luis James Gedo 
Date of Birth: April 13, 1957 
Marital Status: Single 
Case Number: 021402883 
Date of Evaluation: July 2, 2004 
Date of Report: July 2, 3, 2004 
Referral Data: 
Court: Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County, State of Utah. 
Officers of the Court: The order to examine Mr. Gedo was issued by the Fourth District 
Court. The counsel for the defense is Laura H. Cabanilla. The prosecution is being 
conducted by Rick Romney, Provo City Prosecutor. 
Charge: I am not certain which of the many cashes pending against Mr. Gedo prompted the 
order to have his competency evaluated. Ms. Cabanilla sent a summary sheet which listed 
all of the charges against Mr. Gedo. There are at least six cases pending against him. It 
appears that the vast majority all of the cases involve misdemeanors. The cases also 
generally appear to be a product of Mr. Gedo's poor verbal behavior as he has interacted 
with others. I believe that the current case involved a charge of Criminal Trespass. 
Place of Containment: The defendant is currently residing in the home of his mother. 
Type of Evaluation; 
Competency to Proceed. 
Materials Used in Preparation of This Report: 
The following materials were furnished me by Dennis Cullimore, Assistant Superintendent of 
the Utah State Hospital, who is currently assigning forensic evaluations in Utah County. He 
obtained the materials from Laura H. Cabanilla, who is representing Mr. Gedo in the current 
case. 
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1. A summary of the cases pending against Mr. Gedo. 
2. Provo City Police Reports. 
3. Police Department Foliow-Up Report. 
4. Order to Assess Competency to Proceed. 
Materials from the Utah State Hospital: 
1. Psychiatric Evaluation by John C. Woods, M.D., dated July 18, 1983. 
2. Social History by Evelyn Cutler, M.S.W., dated August 5, 1983. 
3. Psychological Assessment and Addendum by Robert Howell, Ph.D., July 23 and 
25, 1983. 
4. Discharge Summary, August 15, 1983. 
Interview and testing with James Gedo at the Law Offices of the Firm that includes Ms. 
Cabanilla. The materials I used include the following: 
1. My disclosure statement (to inform the defendant of the reasons for my interview, 
to inform him that materials in my report could not be used to convict him, to 
screen reading ability). 
2. Folstein Mental Status Examination (a set of brief questions to measure 
orientation to person, time, and place, check memory both immediate and 
delayed, and screen for possible deficits in mental processing). 
3. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised (Five of eleven subscales were 
administered. Five subscales yield a good correlation with an I.Q. score when all 
subscales are administered. It was used to rule out the possibility of major 
intellectual inadequacies.) 
4. I also questioned Mr. Gedo about the roles of the officers of the court and legal 
proceedings and outcomes. His extensive experience in the courts coupled with 
his high intelligence (I had administered the WAIS-R) convinced me that he did 
not need to take a formal test of competency. 
Statute Criteria and Questions: 
I will first give a brief history of Mr. Gedo, followed by the results of my testing and 
interview. A sunftnary of my interpretation of the material I obtained on this case then 
follows. I hope that this will enable the reader to understand the basis for my answers 
regarding the defendant's competence as outlined in the Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-15-
2, which follows at the end of this report. 
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A Brief History: 
When I attempted to arrange an appointment with James for my interview with him, I asked 
that he meet me at the Utah State Hospital. He refused to see me there and instead asked me 
to meet with him in his home. He informed me that he wanted other members of his family 
to be there and asked that I bring a video camera so the interview could be recorded and he 
could maintain the tape. I informed him that I had no camera and was not willing to meet 
him in his home. I asked him to contact his counsel. Thereafter, I called Ms. Cabanilla and 
informed her of my conversation with James. I suggested that perhaps we could meet in the 
conference room of her law office, and she could attend the initial portion of my interview 
and then leave when James became comfortable with the procedure. Ms. Cabanilla and 
James talked and made arrangements for me to meet in the conference room as we had 
discussed. I arrived for the meeting and met with Ms. Cabanilla, but James had not arrived. 
Ms. Cabanilla had James called. In the interim, Ms. Cabanilla told me that the same 
procedure had been used the previous day with the other alienist, Dr. Panos. 
When James arrived, he was accompanied by his older brother, David, with a videocamera. 
David set up the camera and I began my interview. A short while after the interview had 
begun, the mother of James, Maria Sanchez, arrived. We were together about one and one-
half hours. As it turned out, Ms. Cabanilla was there virtually the entire time, and David 
was there much of the time. Ms. Sanchez did not leave after she arrived. This was the most 
unusual arrangement I have ever encountered in the fifteen years I have been doing forensic 
evaluations. It also led me to speculate about the paranoid tendencies of James and the 
collective paranoid tendencies of his immediate family. I was also impressed by the fact that 
James did not consider the effect that his behavior might have on me. He was only 
concerned about alleviating his own concerns. 
James is the second of four surviving children of Luis Gedo and Marie Sanchez. The 
parents were married for about 10 years. They were then divorced. The mother, Marie 
Sanchez, took her maiden name after she was divorced from Mr. Gedo. The family was 
originally from Uruguay. They emigrated to the United States in 1963, stayed for a few 
months, and then returned to Uruguay. The family apparently had a relatively good standard 
of living in Uruguay; however, they again left Uruguay and emigrated to Utah. They were 
reportedly converts to the LDS faith. 
After the divorce of the parents, Mr. Gedo apparently left the family and moved to 
Colorado. This apparently put the family in severe financial straits, and James became very 
disillusioned with^his father and continues to feel that the father does not care for him or the 
remainder of the family. However, it appears that Mr. Gedo does enjoy a good relationship 
with at least one of the daughters in the family. Ms. Sanchez, James, and his brother David 
are apparently most emotionally separated from Mr. Gedo. 
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James went to public school in Salt Lake County when he was of elementary school age. 
Eventually the family moved to Provo and James attended Provo High School. Although 
James was a person of apparent ability, he did not do well in his studies and also felt socially 
separated from his peers. He could be described as a "loner." He describes his grades as 
poor. During his senior year, James moved to Fairview, Utah, and lived with a former 
Bishop while he attended school at North Sanpete High. He graduated from high school 
after his senior year. 
While in Fairview, he worked on his former Bishop's farm while he attended high school. 
He was unhappy about his experiences and treatment while he lived in Fairview. He 
reportedly said, "I thought those people were my friends, but they just used me to work on 
the farm, and then they threw me out." 
James had several summer jobs while in high school. These were through a program for low 
income youth. After his high school graduation, he worked in the Moroni Turkey Plant 
operating a fork lift until the October after graduation. He then began work with a 
seismographic crew, until he was involved in an auto-accident on his way home from work. 
The accident was a serious one. He was unconscious for an extended period of time. He 
was initially placed in the hospital in Sanpete County, but was shortly moved to the Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center. While there, he was found to have several cranial fractures 
in the back of his head toward the brain stem. He also apparently suffered from a cerebral 
hemorrhage. It was also noted that he had suffered trauma to the left side"of his brain. He 
was treated at Utah Valley by Lynn Gaufin, M.D., a neurologist. He was apparently given 
at least one CT scan to determine the extent of his injuries. However, according to his 
mother Dr. Gaufin wanted to operate and remove the accumulation of blood to his brain. 
She would not consent to it and instead insisted on an LDS "Priesthood Blessing." She 
reports that after James was given the blessing they again checked to determine the extent of 
the bleeding, but the "pictures showed that the blood was entirely gone. They could not find 
any trace of it." 
A.fter James was released from the hospital, he had some expressive language difficulties and 
a general body weakness that was somewhat greater on the right side of his body. James 
now says that his language problems are about gone, but he still suffers from a general body 
weakness. 
At some point, apparently after the accident, James went on to the Utah Valley Community 
College and alsa30ok one class at BYU. However, he did not do well in his classes and quit 
after one term. The reasons for his failure to achieve in school appear to be motivational 
and were not related to his intellectual ability. His patterns of attendance at school were 
always sporadic, and it is likely that he did not do the required work in his classes. 
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He began to have trouble with the law. In one incident, his cousin had made threats toward 
him. He was larger than James, and James voiced fear about being hurt by him. James 
obtained a gun. The cousin came to the family home to pick up Ms. Sanchez, his aunt. 
Apparently there was a verbal confrontation between James and his cousin. James went into 
his home and obtained his gun. The altercation continued, and James fired the gun toward 
the feet of his cousin. However, the bullet went through the pant leg of his cousin, although 
it did not penetrate the flesh. Thereafter, James was sent to the Utah State Hospital for a 
Competency Evaluation. This occurred in the summer of 1983. 
He was given a Psychiatric Examination by John C. Woods, M.D. The following are 
excerpts from Dr. Woods' evaluation. They are included in this report because they still 
give a picture of James that appears generally accurate after more than 20 years have 
elapsed. 
...There are indications of an organic personality.... The patient is very concerned 
about what is going to happen to him and is very distrustful.... The patient's use of 
repression, denial, distrust and withholding has blocked information from being 
shared.... He continues to have positive neurological signs.... diagnosis at this time 
would be Organic Personality with Paranoid Features. 
While he was at the Utah State Hospital, James was generally uncooperative with treatment 
and the use of further diagnostic tools. He refused to take psychotropic medications and 
further refused to have CT scans. He was also given a Psychological Assessment by Robert 
Howell, Ph.D. In the Addendum to Howell's report, he reported the observations of Frank 
Rees, who was at the time a student doing therapy with James at the BYU Comprehensive 
Clinic. I quote from Dr. Howell's Addendum: 
Frank Rees told me that Luis was certainly a Paranoid Disorder and he told me that 
Luis believed that he was a God and that other people just weren't on the same level 
that he was on.... He does not feel that his lawyer is on his side and he feels that his 
lawyer is a 'pseudo.'... he thinks that most people don't like him because they know 
that he is better than they. It should be noted that his mother has some of the same 
feelings about herself as well. 
Ms. Cabanilla informed me that James has had trouble retaining counsels who will work with 
him. She is aware of about five different attorneys who have declined to have him as a 
client. However, she has been able to work with him and has represented him on a number 
of earlier cases. :4t does seem clear that Ms. Cabanilla has been able to formulate a » 
relationship with James that could be described as a productive legal relationship. (I found 
myself admiring Ms. Cabanilla's patience and considerable interpersonal skills. It appears 
that working with James requires more than a modicum of these qualities.) 
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Testinn with Mr. Gedo: 
I began having James read my disclosure statement. He read it with ease. He clearly 
understood that the information in my report would be given to both counsels and to the 
presiding judge. He was also aware that nothing in the report could be used to establish 
either his guilt or innocence. 
I gave him the Folstein Mental Status questions. He gave correct answers to all but two of 
the items. He had some difficulty in accurately copying two geometric designs, and when 
asked to make up a sentence he wrote, "This can be my Senz." It appears that he still shows 
sequelae from his accident. At least his written language has still not come back completely, 
and he has some difficulty producing geometric designs (often used to establish the presence 
of brain dysanctioning). 
I then gave James five of the eleven scales of the WAIS-R. Although I only use this test to 
rule out the possibility of mental retardation, his prorated I.Q. was a remarkable 139. He is 
clearly a person of superior intelligence. I found myself wishing that I had included a 
subscale which reflects social intelligence. However, I did not. James has a superior short-
term memory and excellent verbal reasoning skills. However, on one test that requires 
copying designs, he received a score less than average. This was consistent with his 
difficulty drawing designs on the Mental Status Examination and suggests that he retains 
some cognitive difficulties as a result of his accident-incurred brain trauma. 
I asked him questions regarding the roles of court participants and some of the procedures 
that might be used preparatory to a court appearance. All of the questions that I asked him 
yielded correct responses. His answers together with his superior intelligence convinced me 
that he has a good understanding about court proceedings and that anything he does not know 
about his case can be explained to him. I believe he will understand the material which is 
presented to him and remember what he has been told. 
My Observations Regarding Mr. Gedo and My Diagnostic Impressions: 
When I asked Mr. Gedo questions related to major psychiatric disorders, he denied that he 
had any of those symptoms. This is consistent with the terminal exit diagnosis of "no 
psychiatric disorder" which was given him over 20 years ago at the Utah State Hospital. 
However, staff did note paranoid ideation and a general inability to take into consideration 
the feelings of others. Psychiatric nomenclature systems have been altered to some degree 
since Mr. Gedo'^hospitalization at that time. I believe that he now can be diagnosed with a 
personality disorder, namely, Paranoid Personality (DSM IV - Axis II: 301.0). Although 
personality disorders can produce difficult behavioral reactions among those who must 
interact with individuals who are thus affected, these disorders cannot be considered as a 
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basis for a legal plea. Individuals with paranoid personalities live in a world of social 
alienation, most of it of their own making. Such is the unhappy lot of Mr. Gedo. 
I also believe that Mr. Gedo continues to suffer from some sequelae of his accident many 
years ago. I believe that he can be diagnosed with a Cognitive Disorder, Not Otherwise 
Specified, in partial remission (DSM IV - Axis 1: 294.9). When one considers the general 
level of Mr. Gedo's functioning, it is apparent that he does not suffer from major problems 
as a result of this disability. He is of superior intelligence, can speak without difficulty, and 
has generally good motor coordination. Therefore this diagnosis, although important in 
understanding him, cannot be a basis for finding him not competent to proceed. This leads 
to my final conclusion, namely, I recommend that the court find Mr. Gedo competent to 
proceed. 
OPINION ON SPECIFIC STATUTE QUESTIONS RELATED TO COMPETENCY 
Following the standards for competency set forth in the Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-15-
2, answers to specific questions implicit in the Code will be offered. 
....a person is incompetent to stand trial if he is suffering from a mental disorder or mental 
retardation resulting either in: 
(a) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged. There are so many cases 
pending against Mr. Gedo that I was not clear as to what charges the competency opinion 
was related. However, he is a person of superior intelligence who is capable of a factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him. His rational understanding is somewhat 
impaired due to his consistent paranoia. However, his concern about the motives and 
intentions of others does not rise to the level that I believe he can be found not competent to 
proceed. Indeed, the Utah Code expressly excludes personality disorders as a basis for 
consideration as a psychiatric disorder which should be considered in legal proceedings. 
As to the punishment specified for the offense charged, Mr. Gedo is capable of 
understanding information regarding possible punishments as explained by his counsel. Not 
only can he understand what he is told, he is highly likely to remember it without forgetting 
significant information. 
(b) his inability to consult with counsel and to participate in the proceeding against him 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Mr. Gedo has a good working 
relationship with his counsel. I believe that he has shown an ability to both consult with 
counsel and work with her with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. 
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(a) What is the Defendant's present capacity to: 
(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges and allegations against him; I believe he 
has no difficulty understanding the charges and the seriousness of those charges. Once the 
charges are explained to him by his counsel he could both comprehend and appreciate them. 
As we were talking together, he asked me if I had ever been in jail. I replied that I had been 
in many jails but never as a defendant. He replied that being in jail as a prisoner was quite a 
different matter and implied that it was a difficult and distasteful experience. I believe this 
means he appreciates the possible outcomes of the charges against him. 
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; He has a superior 
memory. I believe that he can do this very well. However, his paranoid tendencies make 
any observations about the feelings and behavior of others somewhat subject to distortion. 
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the possible penalties, if applicable, that may be 
imposed in the proceedings against him; I believe he is very capable of both 
understanding and appreciating his concerns about the penalties associated with the charges 
against him. 
(iv) engage in reasoned choices of legal strategies and options; I believe that he has both 
the ability and motivation to work productively with his counsel as strategies and options 
emerge. However, I believe that he has shown a tendency to reject suggestions about 
treatment for his brain disorder. I suspect it may be very diffieulfr-fbr his counsel to 
convince him to do something that he is disinclined to do. 
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against him; He was able to 
describe the roles of both the defense and prosecuting attorneys. He is also no stranger to 
the court system. I believe he understands the adversary system very well. 
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; Mr. Gedo answered any questions that I 
asked him. He also came to his appointment, even if late, and cooperated with me while we 
were together. I believe that he will manifest appropriate courtroom behavior. 
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable. I believe he would be eager to express his views 
whenever asked to give them. I believe that his statements will be generally very accurate 
except when asked about the motivations of those who are doing something that does not 
have his approval. 
(b) What is the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on the 
nature and quality of the Defendant's relationship with counsel; Ms. Cabanilla has 
shown that she is able to work with Mr. Gedo. He has shown that he is generally unable to 
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work productively with many other attorneys. 
(c) If psychoactive medication is currently being administered: 
What psychoactive medication is being administered? He is not taking any psychoactive 
medication. Furthermore, he would not take any psychotropic medications even if 
prescribed. This would require a medical hearing, and his medication would probably need 
to be given by injection. 
(i) Whether such medication is necessary to maintain the defendant's competency. N/A 
(ii) The effect of such medication, if any, on the defendant's demeanor and affect and 
ability to participate in the proceedings. N/A 
Summary and Recommendation Regarding Competency: 
Mr. Gedo does not appear to have a major psychiatric disorder. I believe he has a Paranoid 
Personality Disorder and also shows some residue from his cerebral damage incurred some 
years ago. However, despite his generally difficult personality, I find no relevant reason to 
recommend other than the court find him competent to proceed. 
Respectfully, 
Bert P. Cundick, Ph.D. 
Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview - R 
SUMMARY REPORT 
Defendant: Luis James Gedo DOB: April 13, 1952 Case Number: 
021402883 
Defense: Laura H. Cabanilla Prosecutor: Rick Romney 
Brief description of relevant psychopathology/retardation: He has a Paranoid Personality Disorder and 
still has residual effects from a brain injury many years ago. 
Diagnostic Impressions(s): Paranoid Personality 
(DSM IV - Axis II: 301.0), Cognitive Disorder, Not 
Otherwise Specified, in partial remission (DSM IV -
Axis 1: 294.9) 
CAPACITY TO APPRECIATE CHARGES/DISCLOSE PERTINENT FACTS, EVENTS AND 
MOTIVES 
Degree of incapacity None/Mild X Moderate Severe 
Concerns (expressed psycholegally): 
COURTROOM DEMEANOR/ADVERSARIAL NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Degree of incapacity X None/Mild Moderate Severe 
QUALITY OF RELATIONSHIP WITH ATTORNEY 
Degree of incapacity X None/Mild Moderate Severe 
Concerns (expressed psycholegally): 
APPRECIATION/REASONED CHOICE OF LEGAL OPTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
Degree of incapacity X None/Mild Moderate Severe 
Concerns (expressed psycholegally): 
OTHER FACTORS RELEVANT TO OPINION: 
ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING POTENTIAL [e.g., corroboration of self-report, test data, etc. by 
history, records, collaterals]: His history and behavior are consistent with the diagnoses. 
SUMMARY CLINICAL OPINION: X FIT UNFIT INDETERMINATE 
(IF UNFIT): 
(IF I N D E T E R M I N A T E ) : Reasons Opinion Cannot be reached [e.g., inadequate prior mental health records, 
possible malingering, further observation/evaluation needed] 
Evaluator Na] 
Signature 
Bert P. Cundick 
Date: July 3, 2004 
